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Abstract
This note derives positive and normative implications about the e¤ects of immigration on
welfare and the skill composition of the labor force in receiving economies. The main channel
through which immigration a¤ects labor-market outcomes is the availability of new loanable
funds for investment, which results in endogenous skill upgrading.
Given their high training costs and their lifelong working period, immigrants self-select as
net lenders, which facilitates the upgrading of both new generations of natives and migrants.
Under su¢ cient altruism towards future generations, this induces a Pareto-improvement among
the current generations of natives.
1 Introduction
Both legal and illegal immigration from LDCs conform a reality acquiring unprecedented dimensions
today in most developed countries. Accordingly, there has been a substantial deal of controversy
about to what extent does the average native worker gain or lose from the new migratory ows.
Two recent empirical exercises that obtain quite opposite conclusions are Borjas (2003) and
Ottaviano and Peri (2006). The main reason why the second of those papers estimates a net average
gain, unlike the rst one, is the multiplicity of channels by which immigrants can a¤ect natives
labor market outcomes. Apart from the downward pressure on native wages, Ottaviano and Peris
structural model allows for a consideration of between-worker complementarity and the entry of new
rms in response to higher protability.
I am indebted to Klaus Desmet, Juan J. Dolado, Michael Manove and Dilip Mookherjee for their generous
comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Our purpose in this paper is exploring an alternative (potential) channel by which the immigra-
tion surplus can be enlarged. Unskilled immigrants are often accused of draining funds from the
welfare systems of developed countries, while they contribute very little with taxes given their low
upgrading prospects. In this paper we explore a di¤erent avenue by which they could - at least
partially - o¤set that e¤ect as net suppliers of loanable funds.
We show how immigrants - since they nd cultural barriers that increase their training costs
- usually work during their whole life-cycle, without a formal acquisition of academic training.
Moreover, an altruistic motive leads them to carry savings forward into the future from the beginning
of their life, which increases the amount of loanable funds available in the nancial system. Therefore,
they can provide the young cohorts of natives with savings to nance their educational expenses.
Those favorable nancial conditions lower the ability requirement for those who try to become skilled,
which raises the skill composition in the native economy.
If the productive complementarity is mild enough, wage rates hardly vary with immigration, but
the extra upgrading increases the proportion of natives holding high wage jobs. In this sense, our
channel refutes Borjas (1994)s statement that "an immigration surplus arises only when the native
wage falls as a result of immigration".
The main idea that the paper is currently meant to transmit is the following: It is very likely
that - given their higher training costs - immigrants will remain stuck in their relative position of
inferiority with respect to earnings and upgrading. But, precisely because of that stickiness - and
since they will probably work during the whole life cycle - they can provide natives with better wage
prospects, even in the absence of wage-premium rises.
2 Related literature and justication of the setup
There is a long history of attempts to account for the di¤erent economic performance of immigrants
relative to natives. Initially, migrants´s apparent success to eventually outperform their native
counterparts was justied with self-selection arguments: the human-capital and demographic char-
acteristics of both groups were not homogeneous. However, in the late 80´s Djajic (1989) and Galor
and Stark (1990) inaugurated a line of research by which incentives in the host country - as opposed
to self-selection - were highlighted as the reason for the higher local savings of migrants relative to
otherwise identical natives.
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The di¤erential incentives faced by migrants came from a probability of return migration: mi-
grants saved more than natives because lower future wages increased their future marginal utility
of wealth, and the extra precautionary savings were useful for migrants to outperform comparable
native-born. The novelty of our approach is that it applies even to permanent residents who will
never intend to return. That is, a higher savings propensity does not need to hinge on the possibility
of return migration and an earnings di¤erential.
Moreover, Cornelius (1990) reports that the maturation of social networks of unskilled migrants
in the US is making permanent migration a prevalent phenomenon: "the shift from a migrant
population consisting mainly of highly mobile, seasonally employed lone males[...] towards a more
socially heterogeneous, year-round, de facto permanent Mexican immigrant population in California
accelerated in the 1980s". This fact adds some relevance to the potential channel we identify.
Concerning the empirical literature, Jones and Smith (1970) report that the local (i.e. net of
remittances) savings rate of migrant workers in Great Britain in 1965 was about 2% above the
UK average. For France, the average local savings of foreign workers in 1970 was 50% higher than
those of a French person with the same income (Granier and Marciano (1975)). Further evidence is
reported in MacMillen (1982).
3 The Model
3.1 General Description
We portray a receiving country whose production function combines skilled (Ns) and unskilled
industrial workers (Nu) in a perfectly-competitive environment. For simplicity, we have abstracted
from the use of capital. Individuals supply a unit of labor inelastically, and there is no disutility
from e¤ort. The production function faced by any productive unit is specied as follows:
y = (N"u + N
"
s )
1
" (1)
where   1 is an indicator of technology bias towards skilled labor and 0 "  1, i.e. skilled and
unskilled labor show a limited degree of complementarity. As a result of perfect competition and
given (1), the skill-premium is given by
! =
ws
wu
= p1 " (2)
where p = NuNs :
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As in Galor and Zeira (1993)s model, individuals live for two periods. In the rst one they must
decide whether to acquire skills by investing in education or to work as unskilled, whereas in the
second period they work according to their skills, consume, have a child and leave a bequest. Our
particular assumption is that individuals do not bequeath physical capital, but they transfer some
units of human capital (x) that will reduce their childs training costs in case he/she decided to
become skilled. That is, human-capital bequests are useful to reduce training costs provided that
descendants acquire formal education.
We adopt the assumption of risk-neutrality of preferences and warm-glow altruism, in the form
of parental interest in the future income enjoyed by the child. The assumption on risk neutrality
is a strong one, because in that way the optimal transfer of human capital (x) is independent of
parental wealth, which does not look realistic. Nevertheless, we are not interested in the dynamics
of income inequality, but in a comparative-static exercise between two steady states with a di¤erent
proportion of migrants. Under risk neutrality, there will be a unique steady state, which facilitates
our work. Let us consider the following utility function
Ut = ct + EtWt+1 (3)
where ct stands for current consumption and EtWt+1 for the expected income accruing to the next
generation.
During his/her educational process, any individual must hire a quantity  of skilled professors,
though his own ability combined with the human-capital bequest allows him to reduce that upgrading
cost. In other words, when deciding whether to upgrade skills in period one or not, individuals make
the following comparison:
wu +
wu
1 + r
? ws
1 + r
  (   ax)ws (4)
where ws is a measure of the training costs, which depend on the skilled wage - as in Rigolini (2004)
- because only skilled teachers can train unskilled labor force. The term ax represents the amount
of training that the individual can skip due to the familiar transmission of human capital (x) and
his/her idiosyncratic ability (a):
Unskilled individuals are supposed to work in both periods and save the initial earnings for the
second one, since they only consume and bequeath in period two. The skilled ones borrow from the
unskilled to pay for the training costs in the rst period, and they repay their debt once they receive
the skilled wage. Consequently, from (4), a native individual will decide to upgrade skills at time t
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i¤
a  1
x
 
 +
2+r
!t
  1
1 + r
!
= at (5)
whereas a similar expression a0 holds for immigrants provided that we replace  by 0  :
Our assumption is that parents observe the realization of their childs ability and decide upon
leaving a human-capital bequest (or not) on the basis of that realization. From (5), they know that
their child will only upgrade i¤ x  a , where (!; r) =  +
2+r
!t
 1
1+r and a is the observed realization
of the ability random variable. Therefore, following (3), parents will compare the current costs and
future benets of providing a bequest, which are shown in the following inequality:
 ws
a
+ 

ws
1 + r
  wu

1 +
1
1 + r

? 0 (6)
For simplicity, we have assumed that parents derive utility from their childs gross earnings, before
their debts have been repaid. It is also implicit in the previous expression that the parental decision-
unit is atomistic, and they can not internalize the e¤ect of their decisions on future wages. That
is the reason why they do not expect next-period wages to change. Moreover, we can observe that
parents will bequeath exactly what their child needs to become a skilled worker, and never more.
If the previous inequality is non-negative, it will be worth for them to leave a bequest due to the
high gross earnings of the o¤spring. This will happen only is the ability realization is high enough,
i.e. given (6) there will be a bequest provided that
a    2 + r   !(1  (1 + r))
 (!   (2 + r)) (7)
Therefore, it is the boundary-value for the parent () the only relevant cuto¤ for the decision-making.
Let us denote by 0 the relevant cuto¤ value for immigrants, who only di¤er from natives because
0> :
The previous cuto¤ realization  reveals that our initial range of values for the ratio p must be
such that the skill- premium varies within a certain interval: 2+r  !  2+r1 (1+r) : For ! < 2+r no-
body would consider upgrading, and for !> 2+r1 (1+r) everybody would. Only the intermediate values
sort the population into groups as we wish. This requirement motivates the following assumptions
about the range of values for p,  and  :
Assumption 1:
 
2+r

 1
1 " < p <
h
1


2+r
1 (1+r)
i 1
1 "
Assumption 2: >2 + r;  < 11+r
(8)
The labor force in the model can be native or immigrant. We assume that the amount of native
population is normalized to 1, whereas a measureM of immigrants are already in the economy during
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the rst period considered. The only distinction between any native and immigrant employee is the
cost parameter 0> ; which is higher for immigrants because of the need to learn the language and
similar cultural barriers.
Where do teachers come from in this economy? Since they are skilled employees, they must get
the same wage as the skilled industrial workers, i.e. all members of the skilled labor force must be
indi¤erent between teaching or working for the industry. Moreover, there must be exactly the right
amount of teachers to train next period´s skilled labor force. Therefore, if we denote the measure
of teachers at time t by  t;then
 t = (N
s
t+1 +  t+1)
and hence, in steady state,
Ns = (1  )(Ns + ) (9)
We also assume that a is a random variable that follows an exponential distribution with para-
meter  (that is, the density function is f(a) = 1 exp(
 a
 )). Therefore, from (9) we can derive the
measure of skilled and unskilled labor among natives and immigrants in steady state as follows:
Nun = 1  exp( 


); Nsn = (1  ) exp( 


)
Num = M

1  exp( 
0

)

; Nsm = (1  )M exp(
 0

) (10)
where the subindex n stands for native and m for immigrant.
From equations (2) and (10), we can obtain an expression that implicitly characterizes the steady-
state wage premium as a function of itself:
! = (M;!) =

(1  )1 "
(
1  exp(  1 (!)) +M
 
1  exp(  10 (!))

exp(  1 (!)) +M exp(  10 (!))
)1 "
(11)
It is easy to check from (7) and (11) that  (M; 2 + r) =1; 

M; 2+r1 (1+r)

= 0 and the function
 (M;!) is monotonically decreasing in the skill premium ! (since so are  and 0): That ensures the
existence and uniqueness of its intersection with the 45-degree line, which determines a steady-state
competitive equilibrium.
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3.2 The availability of loanable funds
If we now depart from the usual small-open-economy assumption and consider an endogenous interest
rate r, we can derive an e¤ect of immigration on the availability of loanable funds. This happens
because, in this setting, loans are supplied by unskilled workers who receive income from their rst
period of life - though they can not consume until the second period - and they are demanded by
the skilled labor force to nance their individual training expenses.
The equilibrium interest rate r must be able to equalize demand and supply. It is straightforward
to derive that the relevant equilibrium condition in steady state is
wu

1  exp
 


+M

1  exp
 0


= ws

(   ) exp
 


+M(0   0) exp
 0


where on the left-hand side we have the supply of loanable funds by the unskilled, and on the right-
hand side we can observe the aggregate expenditure on training. The previous expression boils down
to the following equality:
!   (2 + r)
1 + r

exp
 


+M exp
 0


=

1  exp
 


+M

1  exp
 0


(12)
Now we are ready to introduce our basic result:
Proposition 1 Provided that " is close enough to 1, M is close enough to zero and 0> 
then ddM < 0;
d0
dM < 0;
dr
dM < 0 and the aggregate labor income of natives increases with immi-
gration.
Moreover, if  is large enough, additional immigration brings about a Pareto improvement for
the adult native population.
Proof. From (12) we can di¤erentiate and solve for drdM to obtain that
dr
dM
=
h
(!   (2 + r)) exp

 0


  (1 + r) (1  exp

 0


)
i
! 1
1+r

(1 + r)A+ exp
  


+M exp
  0

 (13)
where
A =
1

exp
 


@
@r
+M
1

exp
 
 0

!
@0
@r
We know that @@r > 0;
@
0
@r > 0 and A > 0. For (13) to be negative we also need the numerator
to be smaller than zero, which requires 0 > ln

! 1
1+r

.
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Moreover, provided that M is close enough to zero initially, ln

! 1
1+r

= : Therefore we simply
need 0 > : This last inequality holds i¤
0 > 
Then, ddM =
@
@r
dr
dM < 0. Since wages are invariant - by perfect substitutability - and ! =  > 2+r >
1, the aggregate labor income of natives increases.
Additionally, concerning a welfare evaluation, we can distinguish several groups of adult natives
with respect to their attitude towards the migratory ow:
- Those parents who used to bequeath before will continue doing so, and will take advantage of
lower bequests.
- Those unskilled parents who do not bequeath will have a lower consumption, given their lower
returns from lending.
- Nevertheless, given that their descendants will unambiguously have a higher expected income,
all parents will be better o¤ if they are altruistic enough.
Migration provides a higher proportion of unskilled people who supply funds, which reduces r
and also the cuto¤ values  and 0 needed to access high-wage jobs. For the new ow of immigrants
to provide a net supply of funds, they need to face high training costs in order to enlarge the pool
of lenders more than the pool of borrowers. Our assumption of a low enough value of " has been
made to highlight the fact that we do not need a change in real wages to generate an immigration
surplus, which is opposed to Borjas (1994)´s assertion.
4 Conclusions
This note establishes a formal link between the relative training costs of migrants and their savings
behavior, with an immediate implication with respect to the skills of future generations. One of
the innovative aspects of this work is the absence of any reference to return migration as a key to
understanding the saving behavior of immigrants.
As a conclusion, we can emphasize that the complaint about the relatively poor performance
of immigrants in the labor market may work as a blessing under the right circumstances, since the
reason for their (relative) economic backwardness -i.e. their higher training costs - is also the key to
8
some nativesgain from immigration.
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